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I. INTRODUCTION
Written interrogatories may be used effectively in almost
every lawsuit. They may be used to particularize and elaborate
notice pleadings and to refine and narrow the eventual issues
for trial. They may also be used to facilitate subsequent discov-
ery by establishing the identity of those persons whose deposi-
tions should be taken and the identity of those documents
which should be the subject of a motion to produce or inspect.
Interrogatories can also serve very specific functions, such
as establishing the extent of a defendant's contacts with a
forum for jurisdictional purposes, obtaining information to be
used in drafting an amended pleading, verifying known facts,
identifying expert witnesses, establishing the dates for a poten-
tial statute of limitations defense or obtaining an itemized
breakdown of claimed special damages.
In complex litigation interrogatories are often the only
practical and efficient means of obtaining certain information.
For example, although depositions are relatively effective for
obtaining spontaneous answers, the information is restricted to
the knowledge of the deposed individual. Answers to interroga-
tories, on the other hand, represent the collective knowledge of
the opponent and his attorneys and agents.' Moreover, the an-
swering party is required to conduct a reasonable investigation2
if this is necessary in order to formulate an adequate response
to the questions.
The fact that interrogatories are directed to the collective
knowledge of a party and his attorneys and agents is particu-
larly important with respect to lawsuits involving corporations.
Interrogatories may be used to obtain a "corporate" response
* B.S. 1957, J.D. 1959, Marquette University; member of Schoone, McManus &
Hanson, Racine, Wisconsin; member of the American, Wisconsin and Racine County
Bar Associations.
** B.A. 1972, Northwestern University; J.D. 1975, Marquette University; member
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1. See text accompanying note 16 infra.
2. See text accompanying notes 13-16 infra.
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to questions which no single individual could fully answer. Un-
fortunately, this simple proposition can be confirmed by many
attorneys who have conducted successive depositions of corpo-
rate agents only to receive repeated answers of "I don't know."
Interrogatories are often preferable to depositions for identi-
fying such things as witnesses, documents, the dates and sub-
stance of transactions and conversations,3 since a deponent
may easily forget or overlook relevant information when an-
swering such questions. Written interrogatories are also the
ideal discovery device where the information sought can be
obtained only by reference to several documents or where the
information is of such a complex and technical nature that it
cannot be communicated verbally in an organized and compre-
hensible manner. In addition, the answers to written interroga-
tories can frequently induce intelligent settlement discussions
by establishing the contentions of the parties and exposing the
strengths and weaknesses of their respective cases. Indeed, in
some cases the mere service of interrogatories can result in a
settlement.
Despite decided advantages, however, written interrogato-
ries possess inherent limitations. For example, interrogatories
requesting a description of how an incident occurred, the de-
tails of a particular conversation, or the recollections of an eye
witness are often unwise, since the answers will undoubtedly be
the calculated response of an attorney, rather than the sponta-
neous recollections of a deponent. Consequently, interrogato-
ries directed to such matters should not be propounded prior
to conducting the necessary depositions. Another potential dis-
advantage is the fact that answering a comprehensive set of
interrogatories forces an opponent to prepare his case. Investi-
gation which might have been deferred for weeks or months will
be conducted. Opposing counsel will be forced to analyze and
reanalyze his case, and, as a result, ideas will be born and
oversights avoided. He will meet with his clients and discuss
the various aspects of the litigation. And, in all probability,
this increased attorney-client contact and discussion will im-
prove that party's eventual performance as a witness at trial.
Another practical limitation on the use of interrogatories is
the fact that they can only be directed to a party to the law-
3. See text accompanying notes 39-50 infra.
4. See text accompanying notes 51-65 infra.
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suit.5 Although this may not be particularly restrictive in most
cases, in certain situations it most definitely is. For example,
the employer of the plaintiff in a products liability case arising
out of an industrial injury is never a party, due to the exclusiv-
ity of the worker's compensation remedy.' Often, however, the
defense of such a case is based upon the alleged negligence of
the employer.7 Since interrogatories are not available, the de-
fendant must resort to depositions and other more expensive
discovery devices.
Without doubt, however, the greatest limitation upon the
effective use of written interrogatories is the ability of attorneys
to avoid providing any information which they feel will be dam-
aging to the interests of their clients. This limitation is mani-
fested in varying forms: objections based upon allegations of
privilege, work product, undue burden and irrelevancy; objec-
tions that the interrogatories are vague, ambiguous and incap-
able of being answered; unresponsive (and ridiculously self-
serving) answers; and so forth. The result is motions, briefs,
arguments, and, inevitably, delay and expense.
It is often stated that written interrogatories are an inex-
pensive discovery device. This is a misleading statement. Inter-
rogatories, in order to be effective, must be drafted with care
and precision. Similarly, answering interrogatories requires
investigation, deliberation, and good draftsmanship. Motions,
briefs, and arguments are often required. All this requires time.
And, in this context at least, time is money.
Despite these inherent limitations, the insightful and pru-
dent attorney can successfully use written interrogatories. Care
must be taken in drafting so that objections based upon impro-
per wording either will not be made or will not be sustained.
In addition, an understanding of the appropriate role and func-
tion of interrogatories and the applicable law results in ques-
tions which, even if initially objected to, will have to be an-
5. Wis. STAT. § 804.08 (1973); FED. R. Civ. P. 33. Prior to 1970 the Federal Rules
provided that interrogatories could only be served upon adverse parties. This adversity
requirement was removed by the 1970 amendments.
6. See Wis. STAT. § 102.03(2) (1973).
7. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that, when the evidence calls for it, a
question relating to the negligence of the employer should be included in the special
verdict, despite the fact that the employer is not a party due to the exclusivity of the
worker's compensation remedy. Connar v. West Shore Equipment, Inc., 68 Wis. 2d 42,
43, 227 N.W.2d 660 (1975).
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swered. Accordingly, interrogatories should be carefully
drafted for specific purposes and the proponent must be pre-
pared to go to court to get the answers.
II. DRAFTING CONSIDERATIONS
Good legal draftmanship leaves little doubt as to the precise
nature and scope of interrogatories or a party's duties in an-
swering them. Questions must be clear, concise and precise,
since even the slightest ambiguity invites either an objection
that an interrogatory is hopelessly vague and incapable of
being answered, or an answer which, although arguably respon-
sive, is essentially meaningless. As one judge has recognized,
"Ask me a foolish question, and I'll give you a foolish answer." '8
Thus, attention to detail is essential to the effective use of
interrogatories.
Although many courts have been relatively lenient on inter-
rogators faced with objections that interrogatories are so impre-
cise, confusing and ambiguous that they cannot be responded
to,' the prudent attorney should bear in mind that "[i]deally
an interrogatory should be a single direct question phrased in
a fashion that will inform the other party what is requested of
him."'" Shotgun requests and boilerplate terminology not tai-
lored to the particular case, although initially saving time and
expense, inevitably result in either objections or hopelessly
qualified answers, as well as a seemingly endless string of mo-
tions, briefs and arguments.
8. Pressley v. Boehlke, 33 F.R.D. 316, 317 (W.D. N.C. 1963). The interrogatory
which prompted the judge's remark read, "In what way could you have avoided the
collision?" Indeed, the number and variety of foolish answers to such a question is
limited only by the collective imagination of the bar.
9. In Pressley v. Boehlke, 33 F.R.D. 316 (W.D. N.C. 1963), the court approved of
an interrogatory asking "What prompted you to drive the front of your car into the
left rear of the 1956 Chevrolet on the occasion in question?" The court stated: "That
it is somewhat vague and general is not itself justification for refusal to answer, for in
no event can requiring the defendant to answer the question be burdensome. The most
sound objection to the question would seem to be that it is argumentative; but, for
present purposes at least, the defendant certainly gets the last word in the argument.
If the assumption is false that something 'prompted' defendant, he need only answer,
'Nothing'." 33 F.R.D. at 317.
See also 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2168
at 516 (1970) [hereinafter WRIGHT & MILLER], where it is stated: "Only rarely it is
held that an interrogatory is so unclear that the other party cannot reasonably be
required to answer it."
10. 8 WRIGHT & MILLER § 2168 at 515.
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The principle that individual interrogatories should be sim-
ple and direct does not, however, prevent the inquiries from
being comprehensive and thorough. Indeed, the well-advised
party will serve interrogatories which relate to all the areas
from which he might obtain information which is helpful to his
case. These interrogatories, in order to be effective, must be
drafted with precision. If this is done, the attorney or party who
makes frivolous or ill-conceived objections or provides mislead-
ing or incomplete answers will undoubtedly be assessed costs
in the event of a motion to compel answers.11
A. Introductory Language
Section 804.08 of the Wisconsin Statutes and Federal Rule
33 do not specify any particular form for interrogatories. Conse-
quently, parties are free to utilize whatever drafting techniques
they deem appropriate, as long as the end result is direct ques-
tions "phrased in a fashion that will inform the other party
what is requested of him.' ' 12
1. Setting Forth the Duties of the Answering Party
It is advisable to preface a set of interrogatories with an
introductory section which sets forth the duties of the answer-
ing party. Such a practice serves several functions: (1) it in-
forms the attorney for the answering party of statutory duties
of which he may or may not be aware; (2) it lays a foundation
for a subsequent showing that a failure to make discovery was
willful and deliberate, thus increasing the probability of an
award of costs or the imposition of available sanctions; and (3)
perhaps most importantly, it impresses upon the opposing
party the knowledge, skill and determination of his adversary.
Initially, the duty to conduct a reasonable investigation
should be set forth."3 Interrogatories differ from depositions in
that the answering party may not rely solely upon personal
knowledge. 4 For example, a party cannot, in lieu of answering,
allege that he does not have personal knowledge of the matter,
11. See Wis. STAT. § 804.12(1)(c) (1973), and text accompanying note 00, infra.
12. 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, § 2168 at 515.
13. See 4A J. MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRAcTicE 33.20 (2d ed. 1976) [hereinafter
MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE].
14. For example, in Olmert v. Nelson, 60 F.R.D. 369, 370 (D.D.C. 1973), the court
stated that individuals, as well as corporate parties, must when answering interrogato-
ries provide information which is under their control or to which they have access.
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if he could obtain the information by a reasonable inquiry.'5
And it has been repeatedly held that a party is required to
disclose information known by or in the possession of his attor-
ney, despite the fact the party himself may be personally igno-
rant about the matter.'"
In view of the duty of the answering party to make reason-
able inquiries, the following introductory language is recom-
mended:
In answering these Interrogatories the plaintiff must fur-
nish all requested information, not subject to a valid objec-
tion, that is known by, possessed by, or available to him or
any of his attorneys, consultants, representatives or other
agents.
Obviously, in the case of the corporate party, one would use
slightly different wording.
A second duty which should be set forth involves the necess-
ity of answering to the fullest extent possible, despite the fact
that it may be impossible to provide all of the requested infor-
mation.'7 A commonly utilized dilatory tactic is to answer an
interrogatory with a simple statement to the effect that it is
impossible to provide all of the requested information, despite
the fact that the party is in a position to provide some of the
information. Clearly, such an objection cannot support a total
refusal to answer.' 8 Therefore, in anticipation of such a tactic,
15. 4A MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 33.20; e.g., the court in Breeland v. Bethlehem
Steel Co., 179 F. Supp. 464, 467 (S.D. N.Y. 1959), stated that: "The mere statement
of lack of knowledge by plaintiffs, of the facts sought by the defendant's interrogato-
ries, without any recital of what attempt, if any, has been made to acquire the knowl-
edge, is clearly insufficient."
16. E.g., the court in Maryland v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 7 F.R.D. 666, 667 (E.D.
Pa. 1947), stated: "The plaintiff, having authorized her attorney to bring this suit, to
appear for her and to prepare for and conduct the litigation, was bound to disclose facts
relating to the accident in his possession even though at the time she answered the
interrogatories the information may not have been transmitted to her." See also Hick-
man v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 504 (1947). ("A party clearly cannot refuse to answer
interrogatories on the ground that the information sought is solely within the knowl-
edge of his attorney.")
17. Bar Harbour Theatre Corp. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 5 Fed. R. Serv.
2d 613 (E.D. N.Y. Sept. 18, 1961); see also Riley v. United Air Lines, Inc., 32 F.R.D.
230 (S.D. N.Y. 1962); Magelson v. Cement Masons Local 518, 32 F.R.D. 464 (D. Mo.
1963).
18. The court in Bar Harbour Theatre Corp. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp.,
5 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 613 (E.D. N.Y. Sept. 18, 1961), stated: "[flf [a party] claims to
have less than full information at the time his answers are due he should answer by
giving the available information and by stating that the answer reflects the limited
information that he then has." 5 Fed. R. Serv. at 613-14.
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and to increase the probability of either obtaining some infor-
mation or of being awarded costs or sanctions, the following
introductory is recommended:
If the plaintiff is unable to answer fully any of these inter-
rogatories, he must answer them to the fullest extent possi-
ble, specifying the reason(s) for his inability to answer the
remainder, and stating whatever information, knowledge, or
belief he has concerning the unanswerable portion. An eva-
sive or incomplete answer is deemed to be a failure to answer
under section 804.12 of the Wisconsin Statutes, and may ren-
der the plaintiff or his attorney or both liable for the expenses
of a motion pursuant to that statute.
Another tactic which is commonly employed by attorneys
for answering parties is to raise an objection to the scope of an
interrogatory in lieu of providing any information whatsoever.
This situation generally arises where counsel for the interrogat-
ing party has drafted overly broad questions and his adversary
has utilized the admittedly valid objection as an excuse for a
total failure to answer. For example, an objection that an inter-
rogatory requests information which is not reasonably calcu-
lated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence might be
made even though the vast majority of the requested informa-
tion is both relevant and admissible. Similarly, many attorneys
respond to various interrogatories with simple statements such
as "call for the revelation of work product," despite the fact
that only a portion of the requested information is privileged
work product. The following language is designed to combat
such tactics:
Each lettered subpart of a numbered interrogatory is to be
considered a separate interrogatory for the purpose of objec-
tion. The plaintiff must object separately to each subpart,
and if he objects to less than all of the subparts of a numbered
interrogatory, then he must answer the remaining subparts.
In addition, if the plaintiff objects to an interrogatory or a
subpart thereof as calling for information which is beyond the
scope of discovery (e.g., "not reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence," "work product,"
"unduly burdensome," etc.) he must, nevertheless, answer
the interrogatory or subpart thereof to the extent that it is not
objectionable.
Finally, it is recommended that the introduction set forth




The plaintiff must supplement his responses to these in-
terrogatories when so requested by the defendant prior to
trial. In addition, without being requested to do so by the
defendant, the plaintiff must seasonably supplement the an-
swers to all interrogatories requesting the identification of
persons having knowledge of discoverable matters and the
identification of persons expected to be called as expert
witnesses at trial. Without being requested to do so by the
defendant, the plaintiff must also amend any answer when it
is discovered to have been incorrect when made or when it is
discovered to be no longer true and circumstances are such
that a failure to supplement is in substance a knowing con-
cealment.
Although these duties are set forth in section 804.01(5) of
the Wisconsin Statutes and in corresponding Federal Rule
26(e), their inclusion in the introduction to the interrogatories
alerts opposing counsel to the fact that his adversary is aware
of the statutory duties and is willing to pursue his rights
thereunder.
2. Definitions
The use of definitions of important terms in the introduc-
tion to interrogatories is permissible. 9 If well drafted, they can
significantly increase the overall utility and effectiveness of
interrogatories. However, if they are poorly written and unrea-
sonably expand the scope of the information which is being
requested, they may render many of the interrogatories, or the
entire set, unduly burdensome."
Definitions can generally be used for three somewhat over-
lapping functions. One is to clarify the exact nature of the
information which is to be provided in the answers. A second
function is to clarify and elaborate potentially vague and con-
fusing terms and phrases. The third is to avoid unnecessary
repetition and thereby insure a basic economy in drafting.
A primary example of a definition which sets forth the exact
nature of the information which is to be provided is the
following:
"Identify" (or "state the identity of") with respect to a
document means set forth the following information, if
known:
19. Diversified Prods. Corp. v. Sports Center Co., 42 F.R.D. 3 (D. Md. 1967).
20. Id.
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(1) a general description thereof (e.g., letter, memorandum,
report, etc.);
(2) a brief summary of its contents;
(3) the name and address of the custodian of the original;
(4) the name and address of the person(s), if any, who
drafted, prepared, compiled or signed it; and,
(5) any other descriptive information necessary in order to
adequately describe it in a subpoena duces tecum, or in a
motion or request for production thereof.
Such a definition can be helpful in a variety of cases. There
are definite limitations, however. In a complex lawsuit involv-
ing a large mass of documents the request to set forth the
"names and addresses of person(s) if any, who drafted, pre-
pared, compiled or signed" might be unduly burdensome. In
addition, if the definition is used in conjunction with broad and
general interrogatories, the end result might be totally unrea-
sonable. For example, consider the impact of this definition
when used in conjunction with the following interrogatory:
"Identify all documents which pertain, relate, refer or are oth-
erwise relevant to the plaintiff's allegation that the product X
was unreasonably dangerous at the time it left the possession
and control of the defendant." Among other things such an
interrogatory, when coupled with the definitions, requires the
plaintiff to set forth the name and address of the clerk of courts
(as the custodian of the original), since the court file would
undoubtedly contain several documents which "pertain, relate,
refer or are otherwise relevant to" the allegations of the com-
plaint.
On the other hand, if one bears in mind the inherent limita-
tions and the ultimate effect of definitions such as the one
presented above, they can be used effectively. Thus, depending
upon the facts of the particular case, one might want to simi-
larly define "identify" (or "state the identity of") with respect
to persons and with respect to oral communications. Moreover,
if one defines "person" so as to include all legal entities, as well
as individuals, then he can separately define "identify" with
respect to "individuals" and with respect to "persons, other
than individuals."
The function of clarifying potentially vague and confusing
terms is an important one which can be illustrated by numer-
ous examples. One of the most commonly encountered objec-
tions is that an interrogatory is unclear and incapable of.re-
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sponse. Precisely drafted definitions can often eliminate or at
least reduce the number of valid objections on that ground. For
example, in a products liability lawsuit interrogatories fre-
quently inquire about various aspects of the allegedly defective
product. Some of these interrogatories inquire about the partic-
ular product which caused the injury, while others inquire
about the class of product to which the individual product
belongs. If two simple definitions making this distinction are
included in the introduction, then counsel is relieved of the
burden of repeatedly making the distinction in the individual
interrogatories.
Other examples of definitions which clarify vague and con-
fusing terms abound, and a few will be included here for
illustrative purposes:
"Document" - refers to any paper, book, record, letter,
memorandum, contract, agreement, invoice, receipt, can-
celled check, drawing, sketch, or other similar materials
which contain any verbal, graphic or pictorial information.
"Oral communication" - refers to any oral expression,
exchange or transmission of thoughts, messages, information,
or the like, at any time or place, and under any circumstances
whatsoever.
"Person" - refers to any individual person (whether liv-
ing or deceased), partnership, firm, corporation, association,
joint venture, or other entity.
"You" or "your" - refers to the party to whom these
interrogatories are addressed, but the use of such terms shall
not be construed so as to limit the information provided to
that which is within the personal knowledge of such party.
Occasionally, when the answering party is an individual,
there will be a need for separate interrogatories addressed to
him in different capacities. For example, the party may be
interrogated in his individual capacity or in a collective sense
(i.e., including his attorneys, agents, etc.). Such distinctions
can effectively be made with definitions such as the following:
"Plaintiff" - refers to the plaintiff, John Doe, and all of
his attorneys, consultants, representatives, and other agents.
"Plaintiff, individually" - refers to the plaintiff, John
Doe, as an individual and not to any of his attorneys, consult-
ants, representatives, or other agents.
As stated above, it is generally not advisable to inquire into
the specifics of oral communications in interrogatories, since
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this merely allows the opposing attorney to write a script for
the eventual testimony at trial. However, in particular cases it
may be advisable to so inquire. Interrogatories, because they
provide an opportunity for reflection and probing of one's
memory, can be an effective device for obtaining an accurate
recollection of a particular oral communication or statement.
This is particularly true where it is probable that the answering
party will be as truthful as possible in answering an interroga-
tory. For example, since interrogatories may be directed to any
party to a lawsuit," the defendant might want to propound an
interrogatory upon a co-defendant concerning an issue with
respect to which they are united in interest. In such a case, the
defendant might wish to propound an interrogatory requesting
that the co-defendant "quote or paraphrase" a particular oral
communication. 2 The following definition would be helpful
where there is such an interrogatory:
"Quote or paraphrase" - when used herein, requires that
the defendant, John Doe, solely on the basis of his personal
recollection, state the exact wording of the oral statements
which he is to "quote or paraphrase." If this is not possible
then he should so indicate and provide instead a paraphras-
ing of the oral statement which connotes the substance of
what was said, as accurately as possible. In addition, if the
defendant definitely recalls that particular words were used,
he should include these words in his answer, indicating that
he definitely recalls that those words were used.
The sample definitions provided above are by no means
exhaustive and incapable of being improved upon. However,
when used with foresight and restraint, definitions such as
these may be used to set forth the nature of the information
sought, to clarify and elaborate vague and potentially confus-
ing terms, and to avoid unnecessary repetition.
B. Drafting Particular Interrogatories
1. General Principles
Despite the fact that the permissible scope of interrogato-
ries, as set forth in the Wisconsin Statutes2 3 and the Federal
21. Wis. STAT. § 804.08(1) (1973); FED. R. Civ. P. 33.
22. An interrogatory requesting that a party state his best recollection of a relevant
oral conversation is proper. Byers Theaters, Inc. v. Murphy, 1 F.R.D. 286 (W.D. Va.
1940); Tudor v. Leslie, 1 F.R.D. 448 (D. Mass. 1940).
23. Wis. STAT. § 804.01(2) (1973).
19761
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Rules,24 is quite broad, the attorney who phrases his interroga-
tories in statutory language is certain to be faced with objec-
tions. For example, an interrogatory requesting the "identity of
all persons having knowledge of discoverable matter" should
and would be objected to by most attorneys, especially in com-
plex lawsuits. The statutes merely define those areas into
which interrogatories may inquire; they do not provide model
language which should be used in particular interrogatories.
Although there are few cases which hold that interrogatories
need not be answered because they are too broad and general,2"
a review of these decisions provides a lesson in the proper draft-
ing of interrogatories. For example, in one case a party objected
to an interrogatory requesting it to "state in detail the informa-
tion you or any of your representatives have or are aware of
relating to the accident .. ."2 The court sustained the objec-
tion, reasoning that the interrogatory was "entirely too broad
to permit an effective response." 2 Similarly, in Romero v. Cali-
fornia State Labor Commissioner," the court rejected an inter-
rogatory calling for the identity "of all persons having know-
ledge of relevant facts," calling it a "shotgun" as "broad as
space."
Another common source of overbreadth in the drafting of
interrogatories is the failure to restrict the request to a reason-
able (and relevant) time period. For example, in Auer v. Her-
shey Creamery Co.," the court held that an interrogatory was
too broad because it had failed to limit the request to a specific
time period. And in Transmirra Products Corp. v. Monsanto
Chemical Co. ,30 the defendant was not required to answer an
interrogatory requesting that it state the substance of conversa-
tions between its attorney and certain individuals, where the
conversations were not limited with respect to time or subject
matter.
The decision in Jones v. Goldstein" illustrates the distinc-
24. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
25. E.g., in Lunn v. United Aircraft Corp., 25 F.R.D. 186 (D. Del. 1960), the
answering party made and the court sustained an objection to an interrogatory which
requested the identification of "persons having knowledge of relevant facts."
26. Mort v. A/S D/S Svendborg, 41 F.R.D. 225, 226 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
27. Id. at 227.
28, 276 Cal. App. 2d 787, 81 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1969).
29. 1 F.R.D. 14, 15 (D. N.J. 1939).
30. 26 F.RD. 572 (S.D. N.Y. 1960).
31. 41 F.R.D. 271 (D. Md. 1966).
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tion between proper and overly broad interrogatories. One in-
terrogatory in that case requested "a concise statement of the
facts as to how you contend that the occurrence took place
... "32 The court sustained an objection to it because conten-
tion interrogatories must be directed at ascertaining the oppo-
nent's "position on specific points." A second interrogatory in
Jones asked whether the answering party was making a partic-
ular contention, and, if so, to "give a concise statement of the
facts upon which you rely. ' 34 The court ordered that this inter-
rogatory be answered.
The problem of overbreadth is one which can be easily
avoided by care and deliberation at the drafting stage. For
example, suppose that a defendant wants to have those docu-
ments which support a particular contention or allegation iden-
tified. How should an interrogatory be phrased so as to accom-
plish this purpose? Many attorneys, in the interest of being
thorough and complete, tend to use interrogatories such as the
following:
INTERROGATORY 1. Identify all documents which
pertain, relate, refer or are otherwise relevant to the plain-
tiff's allegation that the defendant's product was unreasona-
bly dangerous at the time that it left the defendant's posses-
sion and control.
The problem with such a request is that, not only does it
seek the identification of those documents which support or
tend to support the allegation, but it also potentially requests
the identification of scores of other documents, including the
answer to the complaint. Even if the interrogatory is not met
with objection, the interrogator might well be provided with an
exhaustive (and exhausting) list of documents. Hours of inves-
tigation, and perhaps additional interrogatories, would then be
required to ascertain which of the documents in the list (if any)
contain information which supports the "unreasonably danger-
ous" allegation. Such problems can be avoided, of course, by
narrowing the scope of the request.
INTERROGATORY 1. [Alternate form.] Identify all
documents which contain information which tends to sub-
32. Id. at 273.





stantiate the plaintiff's allegation that the defendant's prod-
uct was unreasonably dangerous at the time it left the defen-
dant's possession and control.
Admittedly, this interrogatory does not require the identifi-
cation of documents containing exculpatory information, but
the identification of such documents can always be requested
in a separate interrogatory.
In addition to overbreadth, a common mistake in the draft-
ing of interrogatories is the use of vague and indefinite termi-
nology. To some degree this problem can be dealt with through
the use of an introductory set of definitions. 5 In addition, care
must be taken in drafting the individual interrogatories. Par-
ticular words must be analyzed for their apparent and poten-
tial meanings. In technical cases, experts should be consulted.
In one case a district court rejected an interrogatory because
of its general reference to "early American furniture."3 The
court felt that this term was so indefinite and lacking in preci-
sion that the interrogatory could not be intelligently answered.
In another case, the court rejected as too vague an interrogatory
which inquired whether a particular coffee extract was stored
at a certain temperature without any substantial adverse flavor
effects.3 1 On the other hand, in Luey v. Sterling Drug, Inc. 3 the
court overruled objections to interrogatories which referred to
"efficacy," "dangerous" side effect, and "harmful" side effect,
when it was learned that those terms have a clear meaning in
the drug industry.
2. Identifying Documents, Oral Communications and
Persons Having Knowledge of Discoverable Matter
Interrogatories which request the identification of docu-
ments,39 oral communications 0 and persons having knowledge
35. See text accompanying note 19 et seq. supra.
36. Heritage Furniture, Inc. v. American Heritage, Inc., 28 F.R.D. 319 (D. Conn.
1961).
37. Struthers Scientific & Int'l Corp. v. General Foods Corp., 45 F.R.D. 375 (S.D.
Tex. 1968).
38. 240 F. Supp. 632 (S.D. Mich. 1965).
39. "If a document is itself not discoverable, courts have refused to allow
interrogatories that call for such complete information about the document as
to be equivalent to furnishing the document itself (footnote omitted). This rule
seems perfectly proper, but it should not be applied to defeat the right of a party
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of discoverable matter41 are clearly proper. Section 804.01(2) (a)
of the Wisconsin Statutes and Federal Rule 26(b)(1) provide,
in pertinent part:
IN GENERAL. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any
matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter
involved in the pending action. . . including the existence,
description, nature, custody, condition and location of any
books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity
and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable
matter ...
Despite repeated holdings to the contrary," many attorneys
pose work product objections to interrogatories which merely
request the identification of persons. In addition, many parties
plead ignorance to such requests despite the fact that the infor-
mation is available to their attorneys. 3 Clearly, however, the
names of witnesses to the events out of which the action ar-
ises,44 the name of an individual who inspected a product after
an injury,45 and the names of persons who were interviewed by
and gave statements to an opponent's agent46 may be sought
by interrogatories.
With respect to the identification of documents, care must
be taken to keep the request within permissible bounds. If an
interrogatory merely inquires about the existence, nature and
location of a relevant non-privileged document, then it must be
answered, as long as it does not seek information protected by
to inquire about the existence and nature of a document. .. ."
8 WRIGHT & MILLER § 2166 at 496. This distinction is logical since interrogatories which
merely request the identification of documents do not require, for example, the divulg-
ence of work product, but merely set the stage for an eventual determination (generally
on a motion to produce or inspect) of whether the contents of the documents are
privileged or protected.
40. See, e.g., Cornaglia v. Ricciardi, 63 F.R.D. 416, 420 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
41. 4 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.57.
42. Id. at 26-200 n. 2.
43. "Nor may the interrogated party or deponent plead personal ignorance of the
names on the ground that they are known only to his attorney." 4 MOORE's FEDERAL
PRACTI E 26.57[2] at 26-200 to 201.
44. See, e.g., Butler v. United States, 226 F. Supp. 341 (W.D. Mo. 1964); Pacific
Intermountain Express Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 10 F.R.D. 61 (W.D. Mo. 1950); Walsh
v. Pullman Co., 9 F.R.D. 107 (D. Mass. 1949).
45. Baker v. Yellow Cab Co., 12 F.R.D. 84 (W.D. Mo. 1951).
46. McNelley v. Perry, 18 F.R.D. 360 (E.D. Tenn. 1955). However, the answering
party need only identify those interviewed individuals who possess knowledge of rele-
vant facts. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. King, 45 F.R.D. 521 (W.D. Okla. 1968).
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section 804.01(2)(c) and (d) or Federal Rule 26(b)(3) and (4).47
However, an interrogatory which requests a detailed descrip-
tion of the contents of documents is the equivalent of a motion
to produce and need not be answered."
In a particular case a party might be justified in responding
to a request for the identification of various documents by spec-
ifying the records from which the information may be derived."
However, such a response is only justified where "the burden
of deriving or ascertaining the answer is substantially the same
for the party serving the interrogatory as for the parties
served."50
3. Opinion and Contention Interrogatories
Prior to 1970 the federal courts were hopelessly split as to
whether or not interrogatories calling for opinions, contentions
and conclusions were necessarily improper.5' Some courts rea-
soned that, since the discovery process is designed to uncover
and reveal facts, interrogatories which requested opinions in-
volving the application of law to fact improperly invaded the
province of the jury.5 On the other hand, many decisions
pointed out that, due to the advent of notice pleading, interro-
gatories could serve the legitimate function of clarifying and
refining the ultimate issues for trial. 3
The 1970 amendments to Federal Rule 33(b) terminated the
controversy by the adoption of the following sentence:
An interrogatory otherwise proper is not necessarily objec-
tionable merely because an answer to the interrogatory in-
volves an opinion or contention that relates to fact or the
application of law to fact ....
These amendments are also incorporated in Wisconsin Stat-
47. For a discussion of the limits of discovery of trial preparation documents, see
Graczyk, The New Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure: Chapter 804, 59 MARQ. L. REv.
463, 471-72 (1976).
48. Id.
49. Wis. STAT. § 804.08(3) (1973); FED. R. Civ. P. 33(c).
50. Id.
51. See 4A MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 33.17.
52. Ryan v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 5 F.R.D. 399 (S.D. N.Y. 1946).
53. Luey v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 632 (W.D. Mich. 1965); United States
v. Renault, Inc., 27 F.R.D. 23 (S.D. N.Y. 1960); Territory of Alaska v. The Arctic Maid,
135 F. Supp. 164 (D. Alaska 1955).
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utes section 804.08. This provision, if used properly, can be
very helpful in delineating the areas of controversy in a law-
suit. 4
As stated previously, careful draftsmanship is essential to
the effective use of interrogatories. This is particularly true
with respect to "contention" interrogatories. For example, in a
simple automobile collision case a party might propound an
interrogatory which directs his adversary to "state in detail
how the collision occurred." Indeed, such an interrogatory was
expressly approved of in Coyne v. Monongahela Connecting
Railroad." However, the utility of such a broad and general
request is minimal, since any answer would undoubtedly be
permeated with self-serving phraseology. A better tactic, at
least in the simple case, is to confine the interrogatories to
specific points of issue. Moreover, in many situations it is pre-
ferable to phrase the question such that the answering party
must respond with a "yes" or a "no.""6 This enables the interro-
gator to restrict the use of self-serving language.
While contention interrogatories can be used effectively in
a wide array of lawsuits, they are of primary importance in
complex litigation. For example, the defendant in a products
liability case is initially presented with little more than an
allegation that a particular product was unreasonably danger-
ous. Interrogatories can be used to expand and elaborate such
an allegation. For example: "Describe in detail each construc-
tion defect in the product which you contend rendered it unrea-
sonably dangerous."
54. Indeed, this function was recognized by the Advisory Committee in the Note
accompanying the 1970 amendments to the Federal Rules:
Rule 33 is amended to provide that an interrogatory is not objectionable
merely because it calls for an opinion or contention that relates to fact or the
application of law to fact. Efforts to draw sharp lines between facts and opinions
having invariably been unsuccessful, and the clear trend of the cases is to permit
"factual" opinions. As to requests for opinions or contentions that call for the
application of law to fact, they can be most useful in narrowing and sharpening
the issues, which is a major purpose of discovery.
48 F.R.D. 457, 524 (1970).
55. 24 F.R.D. 357 (W.D. Pa. 1959).
56. Although an interrogatory drafted to elicit a "yes" or "no" response is similar
in form to a request for admission, the response to such an interrogatory does not have
the same legal effect. When an admission is made, the matter admitted is conclusively
established at trial. Wis. STAT. § 804.11(2) (1973). Although an answer to an interroga-
tory may be used for impeachment purposes at trial, it generally does not legally bind
the parties. Graczyk, The New Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure: Chapter 804, 59
MARQ. L. REv. 463, 508 (1976).
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If such an interrogatory is propounded, the term "construc-
tion defect" should be defined so as to include all aspects and
conditions of the design, construction, materials, and compo-
nents of the product which caused the injury. Such a definition
clarifies the nature of the question being asked and reduces the
probability of an objection that the interrogatory is incapable
of being answered because the term "construction defect" is
hopelessly vague.
Another approach which can be utilized, depending upon
the nature of the particular product and injury, is to draft two
separate interrogatories which inquire about defects. One in-
terrogatory would inquire about the product in a collective
sense, and would include defects in the prototype. Obviously,
this would principally involve defects in the design criteria. A
second interrogatory could be directed to the individual prod-
uct; this would principally involve defects in materials and
construction.
Once the plaintiff has specified the alleged defects, he may
be required to substantiate his contentions:
INTERROGATORY 2. With respect to each construc-
tion defect alleged in the answer to the preceding interroga-
tory state the following:
(a) the facts which form the basis for the plaintiffs conten-
tion that the alleged construction defect rendered the product
unreasonably dangerous;
(b) the identity of each person having personal or expert
knowledge of the facts contained in the answer to subpart (a)
of this interrogatory;
(c) the identity of each document (including, but not limited
to any books, periodicals, reports, studies or technical
manuals) which contains information which tends to sub-
stantiate the facts alleged in the answer to subpart (a) of this
interrogatory; and
(d) how the alleged construction defect caused or contributed
to the plaintiff's injuries in this case.
If the responses to these questions would require the disclosure
of trial preparation materials or expert opinion protected by
Wisconsin Statutes sections 804.01(2)(c) and (d) and Federal
Rule 26(b)(3) and (4), the response should so state.
While contention interrogatories can be used to inform de-
fendants of the nature of plaintiffs' claim, they can also be used
by plaintiffs. For example, if a retained expert in a products
liability lawsuit informs his client that a particular safety fea-
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ture was both feasible and prevalent in the industry, the
following interrogatories would be in order:
INTERROGATORY 1. Does the defendant contend
that the incorporation of "X" safety feature into "Y" was not
feasible (for economic or any other reasons)?
INTERROGATORY 2. If the answer to the preceding
interrogatory is yes, state the following:
(a) all reasons why it was not feasible;
(b) the identity of each person having personal or expert
knowledge of each reason why it was not feasible; and
(c) the identity of each document which contains informa-
tion, statements, or opinions which tends to substantiate the
defendant's contention that the incorporation of "X" safety
feature into "Y" product was not feasible (including but not
limited to any books, periodicals, reports, studies or technical
manuals) .57
Obviously, X's safety features should be defined in the intro-
duction. Moreover, the definition should be based upon infor-
mation obtained from the retained expert.
Another technique which can be used with success in many
cases is to propound a simple interrogatory directed to a partic-
ular contention, and to follow it with a second interrogatory
which requests the facts upon which the contention is based."
For example:
INTERROGATORY 1. Does the plaintiff contend that
the defendant has waived its right to rely upon the forfeiture
provision of the contract?
INTERROGATORY 2. If the answer to the preceding
interrogatory is yes, state in detail each fact and opinion upon
which this contention is based.
Several decisions have ordered answers to interrogatories
which request that a party specify the facts upon which a
claim, allegation or contention is based.59 For example, in
57. The respondent of course is entitled to withhold only matter which is protected
by Wis. STAT. §§ 804.01(2)(c) and (d) (1973).
58. "An interrogatory which inquires into the facts upon which certain vague and
general allegations of a complaint are founded. . . is not objectionable on the ground
that it calls for a legal conclusion." Sargent-Welch Scientific Co. v. Ventron Corp., 59
F.R.D. 500 (N.D. Ill. 1973); see also Harlem River Const. Co. v. Associated Gas of
Harlem, Inc., 64 F.R.D. 459 (S.D. N.Y. 1974); Jones v. Goldstein, 41 F.R.D. 271, 273
(D. Md. 1966).
59. See cases cited in note 53 supra.
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Pember v. Superior Court,"0 the California Supreme Court
pointed out that an interrogatory which requests a statement
of all facts which support a particular allegation must be an-
swered, while an identical question asked at an oral deposition
need not be. The distinction is based, quite logically, upon the
inherent differences between these two discovery devices. 1 A
deponent cannot be expected to answer such a question with-
out considerable consultation with his attorney, as well as a
comprehensive review of the file and other sources of informa-
tion. Written interrogatories, on the other hand, provide con-
siderable opportunities for consultation and reflection, and
drafting and redrafting.
Despite tremendous potential, there are definite limitations
upon the use of opinion or contention interrogatories. Federal
Rule 33(b) and section 804.08 of the Wisconsin Statutes pro-
vide that an interrogatory "is not necessarily objectionable
merely because an answer to the interrogatory involves an
opinion or contention that relates to fact or the application of
law to fact . . . ." The clear implication of the emphasized
language is that there are circumstances in which opinion or
contention interrogatories are objectionable. Moreover, since
the rules do not specify the limitations, the courts are vested
with considerable discretion.62
An effective test for determining the validity of interrogato-
ries directed at the contentions of an opponent has been devel-
oped. This test was first discussed in decisions preceding the
1970 amendments to the Federal Rules; however, it remains
equally persuasive today.
The applicable test, I think, should not be left to finespun
distinctions between "knowledge" and belief based upon in-
formation from other sources. Rather, it is the practical test
which has been well stated by Professor Moore when he poses
the question, "Would an answer serve any substantial pur-
pose" . . . . The answer is "yes." The answers might be ex-
60. 68 Cal. 2d 601, 427 P.2d 167 (1967).
61. "[A]sking a party, during a deposition for his contentions and conclusions of
law as related to fact will usually be useless. In the vast majority of situations the
deposed party would be unable to relate the facts to relevant legal conclusions. Since
a party's attorney cannot be deposed, interrogatories are the only way to get the
information . . . ." Comment, Civil Procedure - Opinion Interrogatories After the
1970 Amendment to Federal Rule 33(b), N.C. L. REv. 695, 699 (1975).
62. 8 WRIGHT & MILLER § 2176.
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pected to help the plaintiff to know what proofs are required:
it might save him much labor and expense in producing
proofs for which there would be no actual need. In other
words, the interrogatory, if answered, might refine the actual
issue of fact. 3
The "substantial purpose" test has been cited with approval in
several decisions, both prior and subsequent to the 1970
amendments. 4 Moreover, it is consistent with the opinion of
the Federal Rules Advisory Committee that opinion or conten-
tion interrogatories "can be most useful in narrowing and
sharpening the issues, which is a major purpose of discovery.""
C. Answering Interrogatories
All that has been said with respect to the care which should
be taken in drafting interrogatories is equally applicable to
answering them. However, a few principles and techniques
unique to answering interrogatories will be discussed.
1. Answering Vague or Overbroad Interrogatories
Parties and their counsel are often faced with improperly
- worded interrogatories. Sometimes the questions are "so gar-
bled as to be undecipherable or so vague and misleading as to
be beyond the bounds of relevancy." 6 If this is so, the court
would sustain an objection pointing out the obvious inadequa-
cies.17 Often, however, the answering party is aware of the sub-
stance of the request, despite the fact that the interrogator has
failed to adequately express it. In this situation, it is often
advisable to qualify the question prior to answering it." For
example:
INTERROGATORY 1. State whether or not the defen-
dant has ever received any complaints about product X.
63. Taylor v. Sound Steamship Lines, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 388 (D. Conn. 1951).
64. Carrier Mfg. Co. v. Rex Chainbelt, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 717 (E.D. Wis. 1968);
Stonebrook Tenants Ass'n v. Alpert, 29 F.R.D. 165 (D. Conn. 1961); American Oil Co.
v. Pennsylvania Petrol. Prods. Co., 23 F.R.D. 680 (D. R.I. 1959). See also the cases
cited at note 3 supra.
65. 48 F.R.D. 457, 524 (1970).
66. Tsangarakis v. Panama Steamship Co., 41 F.R.D. 219, 220 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
67. Id.
68. "If a party to whom the interrogatory is addressed thinks that there is uncer-
tainty in the meaning of the interrogatory he may qualify his answer if need be." 8
WRIGHT & MILLER § 2168 at 515-16.
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ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY 1. Assuming that
the term "product X" refers to the class of products to which
the individual product belongs, which the plaintiff alleges
caused his injuries . . . [then answer the interrogatory as so
construed].
A similar tactic can be utilized with respect to interrogato-
ries which, as phrased, are either overly broad or unduly bur-
densome. For example, if an interrogatory requests the identifi-
cation of all documents which pertain, relate, refer or are other-
wise relevant to a particular contention, then the following
answer might be posed:
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY 1. This interroga-
tory, as phrased, requests the identification of literally
hundreds of documents, including defendant's answer to the
complaint. To fully answer it would require much time and
expense and would constitute an undue burden upon the de-
fendant. However, the defendant is willing to identify at this
time those documents which it presently relies upon in sup-
port of the above described contention. The defendant has
not completed its investigation, discovery and trial prepara-
tion in this case, and, consequently, the following informa-
tion is being provided without prejudice to the right of the
defendant to produce as evidence at trial any subsequently
discovered or subsequently drafted documents. [Then iden-
tify the documents which are presently relied upon.]
Obviously, whether or not a partial answer and partial
objection such as this would be advisable depends upon the
facts of the case. Under Wisconsin Statutes section
804.12(1)(b) an incomplete answer to an interrogatory is tanta-
mount to a failure to answer at all, thus making the answering
party liable to be sanctioned under section 804.12. In many
instances, however, a partial answer might induce the interro-
gator to settle for the information which is provided. Or, in the
event that there is a motion to compel a further answer, the
court might decide that a good faith effort to answer had been
made and that the interrogator is not entitled to more. In addi-
tion, even if there is an eventual order compelling a further
answer, an assessment of costs would be less probable.
2. Answering Contention Interrogatories
Two principles should be borne in mind when one is answer-
ing contention interrogatories. The first is that, under ordinary
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circumstances, the answers to such interrogatories cannot limit
the proof at trial. The Advisory Committee Note to Federal
Rule 33(b) states:
The principal question raised with respect to the cases
permitting such interrogatories is whether they reintroduce
undesirable aspects of the prior pleading practice, whereby
parties were chained to misconceived contentions or theories,
and ultimate determination on the merits was frustrated. See
James, The Revival of Bills of Particulars under the Federal
Rules, 71 Harv.L.Rev. 1473 (1958). But there are few if any
instances in the recorded cases demonstrating that such frus-
tration has occurred. The general rule governing the use of
answers to interrogatories is that under ordinary circumstan-
ces they do not limit proof. See, e.g., McElry v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 21 F.R.D. 100 (W.D. Mo. 1967); Pressley v.
Boehlke, 33 F.R.D. 316, 317 (W.D.N.C.1963). Although in
exceptional circumstances reliances on an .answer may cause
such prejudice that the Court will hold the answering party
bound to his answer, e.g., Zielinkski v. Philadelphia Piers,
Inc. 139 F.Supp. 408 (E.D.Pa.1956), the interrogating party
will ordinarily not be entitled to rely on the unchanging char-
acter of the answers he receives and cannot base prejudice on
such reliance."9
In Zielinski, the case cited by the Advisory Committee as
illustrative of the type of situation where a party may be
bound, the answers to interrogatories had failed to disclose the
fact that the plaintiff had sued the wrong corporation, despite
the fact that this was known to both corporations and their
common insurer. When the defendant raised this defect after
the statute of limitations had run as to the proper party defen-
dant, the court held that the answers to the interrogatories
were conclusive and binding."0
The second principle of which a party answering contention
interrogatories should be aware is the statutory provision that
"the court may order that such an interrogatory need not be
answered until after designated discovery has been completed
or until a pretrial conference or other later time."7
69. 48 F.R.D. 487, 524 (1970).
70. Zielinski v. Philadelphia Piers, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 408 (E.D. Pa. 1956).
71. FED.R. Civ. P. 33(b); Wis. STAT. § 804.08(2)(b) (1973).
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III. SANCTIONS FOR FAILURE TO ANSWER INTERROGATORIES
Section 804.12 of the Wisconsin Statutes sets forth the sanc-
tions which may be imposed upon a party for failing to answer
interrogatories. This statute is based upon Federal Rule 37, as
amended in 1970, and, as a result, federal decisions are per-
suasive authority and illustrative of the principles involved.
Prior to 1970, the Federal Rules were structured such that
any objection by a party answering interrogatories automati-
cally resulted in a judicial hearing with respect to the validity
of the objection. The 1970 amendments, however, changed this
practice by providing for a hearing only when the interrogating
party has made a motion for an order compelling answers. This
places the burden on the interrogating party, where it more
properly belongs, since the interrogating party is generally in
the best position to determine whether an order compelling
answers is necessary and advisable. In addition, the elimina-
tion of the automatic hearing provision allows parties to resolve
their differences out of court.
A. The Motion Compelling Answers - Award of Expenses
An order compelling discovery may be sought whenever a
party fails to fully answer an interrogatory. Section 804.12(1)
provides in part:
(a) Motion. If a ... party fails to answer an interrogatory
submitted under s. 804.08 . . . the discovering party may
move for an order compelling an answer . . . . If the court
denies the motion in whole or in part, it may make such
protective order as it would have been empowered to make
on a motion made pursuant to s. 804.01(3).
Basically, this initial motion practice is designed to deal
with three recurring factual situations: (1) where there has
been a complete failure to answer a set of interrogatories or
particular interrogatories; (2) where objections have been made
to particular interrogatories; and (3) where the answers to par-
ticular interrogatories are evasive or incomplete.
Control over this initial motion practice is maintained by
awarding expenses, including attorney's fees, to the successful
party. If the movant prevails, he "shall" be awarded his reason-
able expenses incurred in obtaining the order unless the opposi-
tion to the motion was "substantially justified." Conversely, if
the opponent is victorious, he is to be awarded his expenses
unless the making of the motion was substantially justified.
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Finally, if the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the
court is empowered to "apportion the reasonable expenses."
Since most parties will provide answers when ordered to do
so by the court, the award of expenses provision is the most
frequently utilized sanction set forth in section 814.12. More-
over, the mandatory requirement that expenses be awarded to
the victorious party, unless the position taken by his adversary
was substantially justified, is designed to reduce the frequency
and probability of frivolous objections.72
B. The Two-Step Motion Process
With the exception of section 804.12(4), which will be dis-
cussed below, the key to imposing substantive sanctions is the
existence and violation of an order compelling answers. Conse-
quently, in order to invoke such sanctions a propounder of
interrogatories must make at least two motions. The first mo-
tion, pursuant to section 804.12(1), is for an order compelling
answers to interrogatories. Assuming that such an order is is-
sued and that it is violated, the party must then bring a second
motion, pursuant to section 804.12(2), for the imposition of
sanctions.
It is clear from the language of the statute that the court is
vested with considerable discretion in ruling upon the latter
motion. The rule reads in part: "[T]he court in which the
action is pending may make such orders in regard to the failure
72. The Federal Rules Advisory Committee Note states:
On many occasions, to be sure, the dispute over discovery between the par-
ties is genuine, though ultimately resolved one way or the other by the court.
In such case, the losing party is substantially justified in carrying the matter to
court. But the rules should deter the above implicit in carrying or forcing a
discovery dispute to court when no genuine dispute exists. And the potential or
actual imposition of expenses is virtually the sole formal sanction in the rules
to deter a party from pressing to a court hearing frivolous requests for or objec-
tioris to discovery.
The proposed change provides in effect that expenses should ordinarily be
awarded unless a court finds that the losing party acted justifiably in carrying
his point to court. At the same time, a necessary flexibility is maintained, since
the court retains the power to find that other circumstances make an award of
expenses unjust - as where the prevailing party also acted unjustifiably. The
amendment does not significantly narrow the discretion of the court, but rather
presses the court to address itself to abusive practices. The present provision
that expenses may be imposed upon either the party or his attorney or both is
unchanged. But it is not contemplated that expenses will be imposed upon the
attorney merely because the party is indigent.
48 F.R.D. 487, 540 (1970).
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as are just . . . ." The rule then lists some of the permissible
sanctions:
1. An order that the matters regarding which the order
was made or any other designated facts shall be taken to be
established for the purposes of the action in accordance with
the claim of the party obtaining the order;
2. An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to
support or oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibit-
ing him from introducing designated matters in evidence.
3. An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or
staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dis-
missing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or ren-
dering a judgment by default against the disobedient party;
4. In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition
thereto, an order treating as a contempt of court the failure
to obey any orders except an order to submit to a physical or
mental examination.
(b) In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition
thereto, the court shall require the party failing to obey the
order or the attorney advising him or both to pay the reason-
able expenses, including the attorney's fees, caused by the
failure, unless the court finds that the failure was substan-
tially justified or that other circumstances make an award of
expenses unjust.
The rule contemplates a flexible approach, allowing the
judge to determine the timing and severity of the sanctions
imposed.73 As the court in Diaz v. Southern Drilling Corp.74
stated:
While it is true that the courts should impose sanctions
no more drastic than those actually required to protect the
rights of other parties, the language of Rule 37(d) makes clear
that the application of sanctions is entrusted to the discretion
of the trial judge, and overleniency is to be avoided where it
results in inadequate protection of discovery.
The discretionary power of the court is enhanced by the fact
that discovery orders are normally interlocutory and thus not
appealable. A harsh sanction, however, which acts as a final
judgment is subject to appellate review. 5
73. Robison v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 368 F.2d 37 (10th Cir. 1966); 8 WRIGHT &
MILLER § 2284.
74. 427 F.2d 1118, 1126 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 878 (1971).
75. 8 WRIGHT & MILLER § 2006.
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Since the range of available sanctions varies from an award
of expenses to a default judgment or dismissal of a complaint,
courts are free to fashion relief in particular cases such that it
fairly and adequately compensates the movant. For example,
in Ward v. Hester,78 the plaintiff alleged in an amended com-
plaint that an individual defendant was acting as an agent for
a corporate defendant at the time of the motor vehicle acci-
dent. The corporate defendant denied that there was an agency
relationship but refused to comply with valid discovery re-
quests pertaining to the alleged agency relationship. The court
ordered the corporate defendant to provide the information
and, when it refused to do so, held that the issues of agency and
scope of employment were deemed to be established for the
purposes of the lawsuit.
Similarly, in laconelli v. Anchor Lines, Ltd.77 the court re-
fused to allow a defendant to submit evidence in support of a
particular contention where it had failed to answer, for a period
of nineteen months, an interrogatory requesting the identifica-
tion of witnesses possessing knowledge pertaining to the con-
tention, despite the existence of two court orders compelling
the identification. Normally, precluding the uncooperative
party from calling the unidentified individual as a witness in
support of his case would be a sufficient remedy for such a
failure. However, in Iaconelli the nineteen-month delay in
identifying the individuals severely hampered the interroga-
tor's ability to defend, since the individuals, when they were
identified, were no longer within the United States.
The plaintiff in Life Music, Inc. v. Broadcast Music, Inc.7"
was ordered to provide responsive answers to a variety of inter-
rogatories which dealt with several issues. Subsequently, the
order was violated and the court imposed a variety of sanctions.
Of particular interest is the manner in which the court fash-
ioned the relief to the facts of the case. For certain of the
violations the court held that issues would be deemed estab-
lished, while for others the plaintiff was merely precluded from
introducing certain matters into evidence. Moreover, the dis-
tinctions which the court made when it imposed the varying
sanctions were logically based upon the nature of the informa-
76. 36 Ohio St. 2d 38, 303 N.E.2d 861 (1973).
77. 51 F.R.D. 144 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
78. 41 F.R.D. 16 (S.D. N.Y. 1966).
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tion which the plaintiff had refused to provide, and the resul-
tant prejudicial effect upon the interests of the defendant.
The decision in Life Music demonstrates the care which
courts should take in fashioning relief to meet the circumstan-
ces of the case. For example, if a party possessing the burden
of proof with respect to a particular factual issue refuses to
responsively answer interrogatories concerning it, then a court
might be justified in ordering that the facts shall be taken to
be established in accordance with the contentions of the inter-
rogator. On the other hand, if the party resisting discovery does
not have the burden of proof with respect to the issue, then the
preclusion of evidence might be a more appropriate sanction.
Due to the wide variety of situations which can arise with
respect to the failure of a party to answer interrogatories, it is
logical that the rules vest a considerable amount of discretion
in the trial court. However, when this discretion is coupled with
the fact that discovery orders are generally interlocutory and
nonappealable, the result is often quite unfortunate. One tactic
which has been utilized by parties to side-step the non-
appealability of a discovery order is to be cited for contempt.
For example, in Hanley v. James McHugh Construction Co.7"
the district court cited the defendant for contempt due to his
failure to comply with a discovery order. The defendant then
appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals which held
that the judgment of contempt was final, and, as a result,
appealable. More significantly, the appellate court concluded
that it had the power to review the validity of the underlying
discovery order in conjunction with the contempt citation. Ul-
timately, the court held that the discovery order was erroneous
and reversed the judgment of the contempt.
Despite its success in Hanley and other decisions,' the tac-
tic of being cited for contempt in order to obtain pretrial appel-
late review of a discovery order seems, at best, illadvised. For
one thing, there is the possibility that some sanction which is
not appealable will be imposed. More importantly, however, is
the fact that the United States Supreme Court has expressly
stated that "[v]iolations of an order are punishable as crimi-
nal contempt even though the order is set aside on appeal." 81
79. 419 F.2d 955 (7th Cir. 1969).
80. See, e.g., Southern Ry. v. Lanham, 408 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1969).
81. United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 294 (1947).
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C. Sanctions Where There Has Been No Order Compelling
Answers to Interrogatories
As stated above, one way to invoke the sanctions outlined
in section 804.12(2) of the Wisconsin Statutes is a two-step
motion process, that is, by filing a motion for an order compel-
ling answers, and, then - if the opponent persists in his refusal
to make discovery - by filing a second requesting the imposi-
tion of sanctions. A second means of invoking the statutory
sanctions is outlined in section 804.12(4) and the corresponding
provisions of the Federal Rules."2 Insofar as it pertains to inter-
rogatories that statute provides:
If a party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a party
• . . fails. . . to serve answers or objections to interrogatories
submitted under s. 804.08, after proper service of the interro-
gatories, or . . . seasonably to supplement or amend a re-
sponse when obligated to do so under s. 804.01(5), the court
in which the action is pending on motion may make such
orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others,
it may take any action authorized under sub. (2) (a) 1, 2 and
3.
One of the primary shortcomings of this statutory subsec-
tion is that the reference to the failure to answer apparently
does not include evasive or incomplete answers. Subsection
804.12(1)(b) provides that "[flor purposes of this subsection
an evasive or incomplete answer is to be treated as a failure to
answer." Unfortunately, and due perhaps to oversight, subsec-
tion (4) of section 804.12 contains no language to similar effect.
As a result, it is simply not clear whether sanctions may be
imposed pursuant to subsection (4) if there have been evasive
or incomplete answers to interrogatories.
The importance of this apparent oversight is manifested by
a simple and all too common example. Suppose that a
defendant propounds an interrogatory which requests the iden-
tification of all persons who witnessed a particular event. Al-
though he is aware of three such persons, the plaintiff responds
by identifying only two individuals. At trial, the plaintiff at-
tempts to call as an eye witness the third, previously unidenti-
fied, individual. Are any sanctions available under section
804.12 of the statutes?
82. FED. R. CIv. P. 37.
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Initially, it should be pointed out that no sanctions may be
imposed pursuant to section 804.12(2), since that section re-
quires the existence of a prior order compelling answers to the
interrogatories . 3 Since the defendant first became aware at
trial of the evasive and misleading nature of the plaintiff's
response to his interrogatory, no such order exists. Moreover,
it is not clear whether relief is available pursuant to section
804.12(4) of the statutes. Can the failure to provide a complete
answer to the interrogatory be deemed a failure to "serve an-
swers or objection to interrogatories"? The question can only
be answered effectively by a decision of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court.
The statutory provision with respect to the duty to supple-
ment responses also fails to cover the hypothetical example
presented above. Section 804.01(5) states in its introduction:
(5) SUPPLEMENTATION OF RESPONSES. A party who has re-
sponded to a request for discovery with a response that was
complete when made is under no duty to supplement his
response to include information thereafter acquired, except
as follows ....
Obviously this statute does not govern the situation where
knowingly false answers to interrogatories have been served.
Fortunately, there are several decisions which have concluded
that courts possess inherent common law power to impose
sanctions.84 For example, in Taggart v. Vermont Transporta-
tion Co. ,85 there had been an interrogatory requesting the iden-
tification of the eye witnesses to a particular incident. The
answer to this interrogatory did not refer to one Reynolds but,
nevertheless, the answering party attempted to call him as a
witness at trial. The court concluded that the party's actions
were tantamount to a refusal to answer for purposes of Rule 37
and refused to allow the witness to testify. The decisions are
not uniform, however, and other courts, faced with the same
83. The plain wording of Wis. STAT. § 804.12(2) (1973) requires the existence of a
prior order compelling answers. Without such an order § 804.12(2) is simply not appli-
cable. See, e.g., Wembly, Inc. v. Diplomat Tie Co., 216 F. Supp. 565 (D. Md. 1963),
in which the court interpreted FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2).
84. "Even though Rule 37 is not applicable in the case before us, there is no doubt
that apart from that rule a district court has discretionary power to conduct a fair and
orderly trial." Halverson v. Campbell Soup Co., 374 F.2d 810, 812 (7th Cir. 1967).
85. 32 F.R.D. 587 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
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situation as the court in Taggart, have allowed the witness to
testify.8
The inherent common law power of the courts to impose
sanctions has been recognized in various decisions. For exam-
ple, in Stevens v. Consolidated Mutual Insurance Co.," the
defendant, in response to an interrogatory, denied that there
were in existence any blueprints, diagrams or drawing of the
scene of the accident. Based upon this denial the court refused
to permit the defendant's expert witness to give testimony
based upon blueprints of the accident scene. Similarly, in
Frankel v. Stake,s the plaintiff, in an answer to an interroga-
tory, denied having in his possession any statments of any wit-
nesses to an accident. Subsequently, when the plaintiff at-
tempted to cross examine a witness at trial on the basis of one
such statement, the court foreclosed him, pointing out that any
"prejudice is outweighed by our elimination of the element of
ambush from this case."89
It is often difficult to ascertain in advance of trial whether
answers to interrogatories are complete. This is particularly
true with respect to interrogatories calling for the identification
of documents, oral communications and persons. Conse-
quently, it is a good practice to include in trial briefs the sec-
tion which summarizes those decisions which recognize the
inherent common law power of the court to impose sanctions.
D. Constitutional Limitations upon the Imposition of
Sanctions
The United States Supreme Court has held that the grant-
ing of a default judgment due to noncompliance with discovery
orders may, in certain situations, constitute a denial of due
process." The controlling principle is set forth in Societe Inter-
nationale v. Rogers.9" In that case, the trial court dismissed the
plaintiff's complaint due to noncompliance with an order to
produce certain documents under Federal Rule 34. The dis-
86. Wray M. Scott Co. v. Daigle, 309 F.2d 105 (8th Cir. 1962); Wroblewski v.
Exchange Ins. Ass'n, 273 F.2d 158 (7th Cir. 1959); 8 Wright & Miller § 2050 at 327 n.
6.
87. 352 F.2d 41 (lst Cir. 1965).
88. 33 F.R.D. 1 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
89. Id. at 2.
90. See Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322 (1909); Hovey v. Elliott,
167 U.S. 409 (1897); 8 WRIGHT & MILLER § 2283.
91. 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
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missal was granted despite the fact that the plaintiff had made
diligent and good faith attempts to comply with the order and
that Swiss law prevented disclosure of the papers in question.
In reversing the dismissal the Supreme Court stated:
In view of the findings in this case, the position in which
the petitioner stands in this litigation, and the serious consti-
tutional questions we have noted, we think that Rule 37
should not be construed to authorize dismissal of this com-
plaint because of petitioner's noncompliance with a pretrial
production order when it has been established that failure to
comply has been due to inability, and not to willfulness, bad
faith, or any fault of petitioner.2
The precise constitutional limitations upon Federal Rule 37
and section 804.12 of the Wisconsin Statutes are not easy to
define. Clearly, a court cannot impose the extreme sanction of
dismissal unless there is some element of willfulness. Just as
clearly, however, a court can impose lesser sanctions based
upon the mere negligent failure to comply.
[T]he Rogers Court laid particular emphasis upon the
level of contumacy as a determinant of the harshness of the
sanction. It stated unequivocally that no willfulness is neces-
sary to bring Rule 37(b) into play. But it added that willful-
ness is a necessary ingredient in a decision to dismiss the case
for failure to produce. The most that can be said about the
decision is that Rule 37(b) is designed to empower the court
to compel production of evidence by the imposition of reason-
able sanctions, but that the court should not go beyond the
necessities of the situation to foreclose the merits of contro-
versies as punishment for general misbehavior. 3
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite inherent limitations, written interrogatories, if pro-
perly conceived and drafted, can be an effective discovery de-
vice. This article has attempted to demonstrate the purposes
for which interrogatories may be used and the principles which
must be borne in mind so that the interrogator can effectively
accomplish these purposes.
92. Id. at 212.
93. 4A MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTIE 37.03[2.-11 at 37-56.
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